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Stock Investment Research with an Asian focus

2015- Our encouraging first year scorecard

25/1/2016

 
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It has been a little more than a year since we set up stockresearchasia.com in early 2015 to provide Asia based investors with proprietary stock research. While we did not envision it at the beginning, 2015 has turned out on hindsight to be a tricky year for investors to navigate in Asian equity markets. And 2016, for now at least, has proven to be far worse. Many Asian markets have plunged in tandem with the global markets to levels last seen in 2012 or earlier, led by China and exacerbated by an oil price collapse. It is hard to predict when the malaise would end except it inevitably will. As Herb Stein famously remarked and we agree, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” In the meantime, we should see the market throw up good buying opportunities, ones that we hopefully can continue to exploit to our advantage.

It is against this backdrop that we are proud to say that our calls in the last year or so have mostly been spot on.  To recap, we have made outright recommendations on six stocks, five listed on SGX (Memstar, Chuan Hup, PCRD, MILF, IPC) and one on Bursa (Abric). We have also, when deemed fit, made a few situational analyses (Falcon Energy, Kejuruteraan Samudra Timur, Tiger Airways), giving investors some insights into ongoing corporate actions or potential strategic options from a corporate finance perspective.

Performance of our picks

Overall, our recommendations have outperformed the benchmark indices on an absolute basis by an average of 23% as at 31 December 2015. The outperformance would have been more pronounced if annualised but we see the computation of such data misleading and academic in nature at best. The 5 buy recommendations generated an average total return (including dividends) of 13.9%. This includes the short term arbitrage of MIIF where profits were locked in after just 2 weeks. Excluding MIIF, the buy recommendations generated average returns of 16.5%. Memstar, our lone sell recommendation, was down 55.0% as at end 2015 before getting suspended for being unable to complete its reverse takeover of Longmen Group, the transaction risk of which we have flagged out multiple times over the course of the year. 

A summary of our performance is presented below accompanied by key updates on selected companies that we have covered:
Stockresearchasia's recommendations have performed well vs benchmarks
Figure 1. Our recommendations have outperformed benchmark indices by a significant margin

Abric Berhad- cash realised from impending delisting

Following a year during which Abric has failed to find a suitable acquisition opportunity for it to extend its Bursa listing, the company has announced on 18 January 2016 that it will be going ahead with a delisting exercise. In conjunction with the delisting exercise, the company has announced a cash distribution of RM0.43 per share (vs last traded price of RM 0.48), which we estimate is roughly equal to its cash holdings less all liabilities as at September 2015 on a fully diluted basis. This does not include the approximately RM0.07 cash it was due to receive 12 months after the completion of disposal in December 2014 (i.e. December 2015).

As Abric has already announced its decision to dispose of its remaining assets and voluntarily wind-up, shareholders are expected to be entitled to a further cash distribution post delisting. We think that shareholders should also be able to realise an eventual amount close to the Company’s NAV of RM0.64 per share. With a finely balanced shareholding structure (controlling Ong family owns 35%, super minority Pui Cheng Wui 23% and others 42%, fully diluted assuming full conversion of warrants), minority shareholders can also take heart that their interests should be fairly taken care of post delisting. 

Memstar Technology- RTO woes not over

Memstar’s troubles in trying to complete the acquisition of Longmen Group continues unabated. In our previous report, we questioned Memstar’s over optimistic valuation of the target, then valued at US$420 million. Following the umpteenth supplemental agreement, the acquisition price has been revised downwards first to US$323 million in July, then to US$200 million in December, translating into an eye-popping 52.4% in reduction in value in less than a year! This is accompanied by a loosening in the conditions precedent of the acquisition particularly those pertaining to the Target group’s fund raising obligations. However, given the difficult current market conditions, we are still not optimistic that the conditions can be met even with the significantly lowered bar. And to add to shareholders’ woes, Memstar has suspended trading of its shares yet again on 6 January 2016. 

The only silver lining in all these is in SGX’s decision to grant the Memstar additional time (until end May 2016) to complete the acquisition. We can only hope that Memstar shareholders have taken heed of our multiple warnings and disposed of their holdings in time.

Chuan Hup Holdings- hit mainly by FX losses

When we first recommended Chuan Hup, it was on the back of its extremely robust balance sheet, under-appreciated assets and the possibility of a bumper dividend arising from its disposal of CHO shares to Falcon Energy. While Chuan Hup’s financial strength and asset backing have remained largely unchanged, we were disappointed in the board’s decision not to reward its shareholders with a bigger payout. It did announce and pay a total dividend of 3 cts though for its financial year ending 30 June 2015, representing a yield of almost 10% of the prevailing price when our report was first posted.

Results wise, Chuan Hup continues to be hit by the effects of a strengthening US dollar against both SGD and AUD even if its units’ underlying businesses have not deteriorated as much. PCI, its SGX listed electronics manufacturing arm, for example, recorded a 62% plunge in its latest 1Q16 profit after tax from US$1.6 million to US$0.6 million, largely due to a US$1.5 million foreign exchange loss (vs +US$0.1mil the year before). Strip that out and adjusting for mark-to-market profits/losses and the core profit would have remained almost the same as the 1Q15’s. Similarly, a US$6.1 million hit from foreign exchange losses was the main culprit for Chuan Hup reporting a loss of US$3.9 million for 1Q16 vs a profit of US$3.0 million in 1Q15.

For its joint venture property development projects in Australia, the results have been mixed. Toccata, which has been completed is almost fully sold. We estimate that only 10-15% of the sales have yet to be recognised. Meanwhile, Concerto, the largest of the 3 projects by development value, has sold an additional 50 units over the past 11 months to achieve 68% in total sales. With completion due only in 2017, we believe there is still enough time for the JV to ramp up sales to 80-85% or more, similar to what Toccata achieved at its completion. Sales in Unison on Tenth, however, has made little progress in the last few months in particular and 48% of its units remain unsold despite the fast approaching completion deadline. That said, as we have stressed in our previous report, we do not expect any negative cashflow impact from these projects as Chuan Hup’s main obligations in these is in injecting the land while Finbar contributed the working capital. 
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Figure 2. Sales performance of Chuan Hup’s JV development projects have been mixed

As at the latest balance sheet date of 30 September 2015, we estimate that Chuan Hup still holds, after accounting for dividends paid after, adjusted net cash and short term securities worth S$0.194 per share or almost 73% of its last traded price of S$0.265, which should provide a strong buffer against the current market volatilities. 

Pacific Century Regional Development- delisting imminent if share buybacks continue

Since our report highlighting PCRD’s aggressive share buybacks and suggesting that this may be a prelude to majority shareholder Richard Li potentially privatising the company, PCRD has not shown any intent to restrain its share buyback activities. In the past 9 months, the company has acquired a further 89.1 million shares, shrinking the public float to a precariously low 10.2%. We estimate that the company can only acquire and cancel a further 5.1 million shares before its trading has to be halted pending a delisting decision to be made.
PCRD's share buybacks have boosted Richard Li's stake and shrunk public float
Figure 3. Aggressive share buyback from PCRD has shrunk public float precariously close to 10% threshold

To recap a point made in our update report on 5 May 2015:

“Under the current regulatory regime, there are a few ways that PCRD's privatisation could take place: through a general offer, a scheme of arrangement, a voluntary delisting or a forced delisting by SGX due to low free float (<10%) coupled with an exit offer. Based on current circumstances, we see the last two as the most likely options. Both would require a reasonable exit offer to be tabled and the appointment of an independent financial adviser ("IFA") to opine on the fairness of the offer as stipulated in the SGX listing rules. We note that IFAs tend to benchmark fair value of a company's shares to the market prices of its underlying assets where such values are available as in the case of PCRD. As such, we do not expect any exit offer, if it materialises, to deviate greatly from the fair value computed using this methodology in order to obtain a positive recommendation from the IFA.”
Share prices of PCCW and HKT  have held up well vs Hang Seng Index
Figure 4. PCRD’s key underlying assets, HKT and PCCW, are up 6.9% and 3.5% respectively in the last 3 months and has held up well vs HSI, which declined 17% over the same period.

As at 22 January 2016, PCRD’s stakes in PCCW and HKT, both of which shares have held up well despite the recent market turmoil, is worth a total of S$0.61 per share. While it remains to be seen if the “reasonable” offer by Richard Li comes close to matching the market value of PCRD’s underlying assets in the event the mandatory delisting and exit offer is triggered, we believe that that any IFA appointed will use this as a benchmark to base its recommendation on. Richard Li would thus find it hard to justify offering an amount that is significantly less. With the shares trading at $0.37 as at 22 January 2016, we believe PCRD still has significant upside. 

Closing note

While our first year scorecard has certainly been encouraging, our focus is solely on longer term returns. In that regard, we do not expect our picks to be able to outperform the markets by such wide margins year in year out. However, we are confident that with a relentless focus on value and our core competencies, we would be able to generate a positive return on our picks relative to the market over the long run. 

Tiger Airways Ltd: SIA declares offer unconditional, further implications 

11/1/2016

 
Less than 2 days after our initial post diagnosing the current state of SIA’s takeover offer for Tigerair shares, SIA upped the ante by announcing that it has waived the 90% acceptance condition, making the offer unconditional in all aspects, as well as further extending the offer period to 5 February 2016 from 22 January. It also announced that shares it and its concert parties control including valid acceptances has reached 79.22% of total outstanding shares as at 8 January 2016. 
SIA's offer for Tigerair now unconditional
Our Take

We see the latest move by SIA as positive for SIA and minority shareholders of Tigerair who have either accepted or plan to accept the revised offer. Specifically for SIA, declaring the offer unconditional offers it a couple of advantages.

Higher chance of SIA getting to the compulsory acquisition threshold

Firstly, it means that SIA can now extend the offer beyond the 60th day (25 January 2016) to 5 February 2016. As explained in our previous post, an offer will not be allowed to extend beyond the 60th day after the date of posting of the Offer Document unless it has become or been declared unconditional. This is important for SIA as its ultimate aim is to be able to fully privatize Tigerair. Being able to extend the offer period gives it more time to accumulate acceptances and consequently a higher likelihood of bringing its total shareholdings across the compulsory acquisition threshold of 95.58%.

Opens up other privatization options in future

Furthermore, declaring the offer unconditional allows SIA to keep any shares tendered during the offer period even if its resultant shareholding ends up being less than 90%. From a strategic perspective, the tighter control opens up future privatization options such as a voluntary delisting via Rule 1307 of the SGX Listing Manual where, as the majority shareholder holding more than 75%, it will be able to vote through the delisting resolution subject to no more than 10% of shareholding votes present at the general meeting voting against it.

News is positive for shareholders who intend to accept…

For shareholders who have already accepted or intend to accept the revised offer, the waiver of the 90% acceptance condition gives them certainty of monetizing their holdings at the offer price. This is unlike under the previous scenario, where they would have to wait for SIA’s total shareholdings plus acceptance level to cross 90%.

…but not so much for dissenting shareholders.

On the other hand, shareholders who had intended to hold out with the expectation that SIA may revise the offer price upwards again, however low the possibility, will be solely disappointed to see their hopes dashed. For this group of shareholders, you may refer to Scenarios B and C depicted in our previous post.

Tiger Airways Holdings Ltd takeover: What should shareholders take note of?

10/1/2016

 
It has been a full 2 months since Singapore Airlines Ltd (“SIA”) launched a much awaited takeover offer for all shares in Tiger Airways Holdings Ltd (“Tigerair”) it does not own. Yet, there seems to be a fair bit of hesitation amongst Tigerair minority shareholders in accepting the revised offer from SIA of $0.45 per share (up previously from $0.41). Some of the unhappiness stems from the fact that the Singapore national carrier paid a comparatively higher price of 67.8 cents per share to acquire a 7.3% stake from its parent company Temasek Holdings in December 2013.

While we will not weigh in on the fairness of the offer (there are enough market opinions/advice out there for minority shareholders to mull over with respect to that), we believe that shareholders should take note of some key issues when considering whether to ultimately accept SIA’s revised offer.
SIA plane and Tiger Airways mascot
Figure 1: Will the Singapore national carrier succeed in fully taming the Tiger(air)? (Picture source: wikipedia, NT News)

Background

SIA initially launched an offer of $0.41 per share for all Tigerair shares not owned by it on 6 November 2015. The offer is conditional upon SIA’s total shareholding inclusive of valid acceptances hitting at least 90% before the end of the offer period. While the offer was originally slated to end on 28 December 2015, it was extended to 8 January 2016 after SIA fell way short of its target (74.5% then vs 90%).

On 4 January 2016, SIA revised the offer price to $0.45 and further extended the deadline to 22 January 2016 indicating at the same time that it does not intend to revise the price further.

Key points to note

Current offer vs consideration for Temasek’s shares in 2013

So is the SIA revised offer really worse off when compared to the consideration it paid for the Temasek sale shares as some believed? On the surface, it may seem so. After all, on an absolute per share basis, 45 cents per share is 34% less than the 67.8 cents SIA previously paid. This, however, has not taken into account the 85 for 100 rights issue in late 2014 during which Tigerair offered new shares to then existing shareholders at 20 cents per share. Once accounted for, the consideration paid during the Temasek purchase would have been adjusted down to 45.8 cents, just 2% higher than SIA’s current offer.

Furthermore, the current SIA offer that is taking place at a time when the market conditions are weaker (as measured by FSTE ST All Share index), is also superior when we compare other measures such as premium paid over prevailing market prices and the implied price to book ratio.

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Figure 2: SIA’s current offer is no less compelling than that offered to Temasek in 2013

Hence, we think there is little evidence to suggest that the current revised offer is less compelling than that offered to Temasek for its shares in 2013.

Offer may not be extended by much longer due to regulatory restrictions

That SIA has extended its offer period twice so far in a bid to convince Tigerair minorities shows its resolve to take the ailing budget airline private. Still, shareholders who have yet to take up the offer should not expect another significant extension. This is because the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers specifically provides that:

“No offer (whether revised or not) will be capable of becoming or being declared unconditional as to acceptances after 5.30 pm on the 60th day after the date the offer document is initially posted nor of being kept open after the expiry of such period unless it has previously become or been declared unconditional as to acceptances. An offer may be extended beyond that period of 60 days with the permission of the Council. The Council will consider granting such permission in circumstances, including but not limited to, where a competing offer has been announced.”

As the Offer Document was posted on 26 November 2015, this implies, by our calculation, that SIA would not be able to extend its offer period beyond 25 January 2015 (vs the current deadline of 22 January 2015) unless permission is sought from the Securities Industry Council (SIC), often in exceptional circumstances such as a competing offer. With SIA owning more than 57% as at 8 January 2016, not including acceptances as offer has not turn unconditional, it is hard to see the SIC allowing such an extension. 

Likely scenarios and their implications for shareholders

So given that SIA’s offer is unlikely to be revised or extended much further, shareholders should naturally be aware of the different scenarios that will play out come 22 January 2016 and how it will affect their options.  

Scenario A: SIA fails to hit the 90% shareholding threshold

As the offer is conditional upon SIA hitting the 90% shareholding threshold, the offer will lapse if SIA falls short of this level. Consequently, all Tigerair minority shareholders, regardless of whether they have previously accepted the offer, will retain all their original shareholdings and not receive any consideration from SIA for them. 

Scenario B: SIA reaches the compulsory acquisition level (95.58%)

Under Section 215(1) of the Companies Act of Singapore, SIA would be entitled to compulsorily acquire all shares held by the minority shareholders should it accumulate during the offer period, through valid acceptances or on-market acquisitions during the offer period at least 90% of all shares excluding those owned by it at the start of the offer.  Since SIA and its concert parties already owned 55.79% of Tigerair’s shares as at commencement of the offer, this follows that it will need to acquire another 39.79% (0.9 x 44.21%) during the offer period, hence a total of 95.58%, to have the right acquire all minority shareholdings. Under this scenario, all shareholders would have to sell their shares to SIA irrespective of whether they chose to accept the offer.

Scenario C: SIA reaches 90% but falls short of compulsory acquisition level (95.58%)

If the eventual shareholding of SIA falls between 90% and 95.58% during the offer period, the situation becomes a little more complex.

Firstly, the offer will still be declared unconditional and all shareholders who have tendered their shares prior to closing, will be entitled to receive the revised offer price for their shares.

For dissenting shareholders who chose not to accept the offer, you should note that under the SGX listing rules, any listed company with a public float of less than 10% will face a trading suspension imposed by SGX and an eventual delisting unless the company takes the necessary steps to restore the public float to the minimum level. As SIA has already explicitly indicated that it does not intend to restore the public float and retain the listing under this scenario, these dissenting shareholders will likely be holding shares in a private company post the offer period.

However, dissenting shareholders will still be able to require SIA to acquire their shares for a period of time after the offer period by invoking their rights under Section 215(3) of the Companies Act. This right kicks in as long as SIA acquires at least 90% of all Tigerair shares including those it held as at commencement of the offer. Shareholders should note the difference between their right to require their Tigerair shares to be acquired by SIA and the right by SIA to compulsorily acquire theirs.

Should the dissenting shareholders choose neither to accept the revised offer nor to invoke their rights under Section 215(3) of the Companies Act, they will remain as minority shareholders of an unlisted Tigerair. While such a situation may not be ideal given that they will no longer have the benefit of being able to trade their Tigerair shares on SGX, there have been instances (the CK Tang privatisation in 2009 comes to mind) where holding out may pay off eventually in the form of an improved offer in future if Tigerair shares are indeed being undervalued by SIA’s current offer as they might believe.

Final Note

We may have taken all reasonable efforts to verify the information we presented in order to provide shareholders and investors in general with a good overview of the key issues pertaining to the SIA offer. Nevertheless, we encourage all investors and shareholders alike to familiarise themselves with key regulations governing a takeover offer including the SGX Listing Manual, Singapore Companies Act Section 215 and the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers. This is so that they would be better equipped to evaluate their options and make better investment decisions should circumstances similar to this arise in future. 

(All currency in SGD unless stated)
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We put money where our mouth is. As such, we do take positions in the securities mentioned on this website or any securities related thereto and may from time to time add or dispose of or may be materially interested in any such securities. The research materials provided on this site is for information only. Investors should seek the assistance of a qualified and licensed financial advisor in making their investment decisions. The research reports/notes are compiled based on information, which we believe to be reliable. Any opinions expressed reflect our judgment at as at the date of the reports or notes and are subject to change without notice. It does not have regards to the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of any specific person who may receive or access this research material. Our recommendations are not to be construed as an offer, or solicitation of an offer to sell or buy securities referred herein. The use of this material does not absolve you of your responsibility for your own investment decisions. We accept no liability for any direct or indirect loss arising from the use of this research material. This research material may not be reproduced, distributed or published for any purpose by anyone without our specific prior consent.